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BAR BRIEFS

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Filed March 20, 1936.
Elmer King, Plaintiff and Respondent vs. The County of Stark, a
Municipal Corporation, the State of North Dakota, The Department of State Highways, and W. J. Flannigan as Highway Commisioner of the State of North Dakota, Defendants
and Appellants.
1. The section lines are highways of this State to the width of
two rods on each side of the section line.
2. The highways belonging to the State, and the State, acting in
its sovereign capacity, may grade and improve the highways on said
lines as in its judgment may be necessary for the convenience and safety
of the public.
3. An abutting owner has the right of ingress or egress to such
highway subject to the paramount right of the State to improve and
control the highway in the interest of the public, but such owner can
not insist on this right of ingress and egress at any place he sees fit as
he holds this right subject to the superior right of the State.
4. An application for a temporary injunction should be denied
where the complaint does not show a cause of action and defects in the
complaint can not be supplied by affidavit.
(Syllabus by the Court)
Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Hon. Harvey
Miller, Judge.
REVERSED.
ially concurring.

J.

Opinion of the Court by Burr, J., Nuessle J., spec-

Filed March 25, 1936.
L. E. Heaton, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. Anna V. Hoerr,
et al, Defendants and Respondents.
SYLLABUS: 1. In an action to recover for money had and
received, for goods sold and delivered, and for storage charges for
grain stored in plaintiff's warehouse, the record is examined, and it is
HELD, for reasons stated in the opinion, that the plaintiff is entitled
to recover on two of the causes of action stated in the complaint.
2. A grain warehouseman's notice of sale of grain in satisfaction
of his lien for storage charges is not given as required by the statute,
section 3 1 25a33, 1925 Supplement, C. L. 1913, where the person on
whose account the grain is stored and to whom the warehouse receipt
therefor was issued is deceased and the warehouseman knows of his
decease, and such notice is given by registered letter addressd to the deceased at his last known place of business.
3. A warehouseman's sale of grain in satisfaction of his lien for
storage charges without the giving of notice thereof as required by the
statute, section 3125a33, Supplement, is void and constitutes a conversion.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. H. L.

BAR BRIEFS

Berry, Judge. Action to recover for money had and received, fot
goods sold and delivered, and for storage charges for grain stored. From
a judgment for the defendants, plaintiff appeals.
MODIFIED and remanded with directions to enter judgment for
the plaintiff on two of the several causes of action set out in the complaint.
Opinion of the Court by Nuessle, J.

S. E. Ellsworth, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. Martindale-Rubbell
Law Directory, Inc., a corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
SYLLABUS: 1. In an action for libel the defamatory publication must be set out in the complaint. It is not sufficient to allege
such publication in substance and effect. Held, for reasons set out in
the opinion that the complaint sufficiently alleges a defamatory publication.
2. In determining whether a publication is libelous per se, it must
be stripped of all innuendo, colloquium and explanatory circumstances.
3. A defamatory publication is libelous per se when without the
aid of innuendo it must be presumed to expose the plaintiff to hatred,
contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or cause him to be shunned or avoided,
or have a tendency to injure him in his occupation.
4. General damages do not result, as a matter of course, from the
publication of defamatory matter that is not libelous per se, and in an
action for libel based thereon the complaint is demurrable if it does not
allege special damages.
5. A publication that is not libelous per se cannot be assumed to
be understood in a defamatory sense by the readers thereof. A complaint
alleging such publication fails to state a cause of action unless a defamatory understanding is also alleged.
APPEAL from the District Court of Stutsman County, Hon. H. L.
Berry, Sp. J.
REVERSED AND REMANDED. Opinion of the Court by Mor-

ris, J.
INSANITY AND THE LAW
The discussion in this article is confined to the meaning of the term
insanity, as used in the criminal law-a disease or defect of mind which
renders the individual incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.
The standards of conduct which have been set up by the criminal
law are closely related to currently accepted social standards of morality.
"These standards are more or less empirical." They are based upon
that which common experience seems to teach us is fair to expect from
the average man. He is presumed to be capable of living up to these
empirical standards, and when he falls short of these requirements it
is prima facie presumed that the has done so voluntarily and by intent.
and he must expect to bear the consequences if he is apprehended and
convicted. But if he can show that for some reason or other he did not.

